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Background: This article considers the moral notion of care in the context of Quality of Care discourses. Whilst care
has clear normative implications for the delivery of health care it is less clear how Quality of Care, something that is
centrally involved in the governance of UK health care, relates to practice.
Discussion: This paper presents a social and ethical analysis of Quality of Care in the light of the moral notion of
care and Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic violence. We argue that Quality of Care bureaucracies show significant
potential for symbolic violence or the domination of practice and health care professionals. This generates
problematic, and unintended, consequences that can displace the goals of practice.
Summary: Quality of Care bureaucracies may have unintended consequences for the practice of health care.
Consistent with feminist conceptions of care, Quality of Care ‘audits’ should be reconfigured so as to offer a more
nuanced and responsive form of evaluation.
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The delivery of ‘care’ is at the core of any system of
health care, something that we understand to be consti-
tuted by a complex network of interdependent practices
that can be seen as being ‘ordered’ within the micro,
meso, and macro social contexts of care: delivery, man-
agement and political oversightb. The idea(l) of ‘care’ is
an essentially normative or moral concept; arguably to
care badly is not to care at all. There is a practical and
moral obligation on health care organizations to manage
the delivery of ‘care’ or, perhaps more importantly, to
ensure services are provided with care. Health and social
care services encompass activities as wide ranging as
bathing or feeding a patient to the deployment of com-
plex medical technologies and medicinesc. Whilst these
diverse activities contribute to constituting health care
services, it is in the manner of their delivery and the par-
ticularities of their provision that the essence of ‘care’ is
to be found. As Mol argues, the ideal of good care does
not speak for itself as it is not constituted by the services
themselves; rather, it is something that ought to be* Correspondence: n.emmerich@qub.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.incorporated into such services [1]. Care can be thought
of as residing in the subjective, and intersubjective, expe-
riences of patients, clients and professionals. That is,
care is not merely an attribute of a particular service but
the way it is provided or delivered. Care involves an
emotional stance and relational quality that can, but
may not, accompany the activities constitutive of health
care provision.
In this view, taking care of someone involves not only
being careful in the sense of proceeding with due atten-
tion but involves being ‘care’-ful, in the sense of adopting
or embodying a particular emotional posture or stance
[2]. Given the dual nature of ‘care’ in health care – it is
both service and stance - the meaning of the phrase
‘Quality of Care’a is, in some sense, a second order idea
which combines these two components. It is not usually
about the services and the delivery of care per se, but
about ways in which services are organized, delivered and
accounted ford in response to particular organizational
structures or bureaucratic regimes. The scale we invoke
by considering the notion and operationalization of Qual-
ity of Care is not the micro-level of practice or the inter-
action between professional and patient, (where care is
actually experienced in all its intersubjective nuance) but
the meso- and macro- level of social structure - the socialtral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Quality of Care operates at the level of the clinic, the
hospital, the NHS, the Care Quality Commission and
broader socio-political arrangements. Furthermore, Qual-
ity of Care emerges from a particular orientation towards
our system of health care, an orientation which collectiv-
izes, generalizes and - to a large extent- decontextualizes
care itself. Thus we suggest contemporary approaches to
the care and the management of care reiterate the per-
sistent tendency to eliminate the messy business of
‘care itself ’ from the public sphere. The inherently (in-
ter)subjective experiences of care and caring, the ‘life-
world’ of individuals and small groups of individuals
participating in the actual provision of care are rele-
gated to the private realm whilst only objectified mea-
sures of its ‘quality’ are afforded ‘public’ - managerial or
political - significance.
Discussion: care and quality of care
It is clear that one cannot conceive of a system of health
care that does not involve the delivery of care. The prac-
tical tasks such systems deliver are diverse and range
from the mundane, day-to-day and routine to the un-
usual, ‘high tech’ and singular. Consider, for example, the
following examples: getting people out of bed, washing
them, providing food, ensuring medicines are taken at
the correct time and dose, providing physiotherapy or
rehabilitation services, monitoring life signs, conducting
tests (urine, blood, radiographic etc.), providing vaccina-
tions or intravenous infusions, undertaking internal exam-
inations, conducting operations and transplanting organs.
All can be considered examples of patient ‘care’ and we
might, therefore, wonder how to define care such that it is
applicable to this range of activities. We might think of
‘care’ as a secondary and normative quality of first order
tasks or substantive practices. Whether done badly or
well, getting someone up in the morning or providing a
program of rehabilitation is to provide care. However
when it is done well it is done with care. It is this sense of
care that is of primary interest, and something that is
present in Tronto’s suggestion that “[c]are is both a prac-
tice and a disposition” [3]. In her view we should only
refer to care when both are present. Thus, the nurse who
washes patients in an uncaring manner does not provide
care in the fullest possible sense, even though such activ-
ities can be considered as care simpliciter.
Tronto and Fisher define care as:
[A] species of activity that includes everything that we
do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so
that we can live in it as well as possible [3,4]e.
So defined, care is a disposition to ‘living well’ that can
be expressed in almost all activities. As such care almostalways occurs as part of other activities. Whilst some ac-
tivities instantiate care alone as in, for example, a parent
who comforts their child when they have grazed their
knee or a spouse who reassures their partner before
their first day in a new job. Even so, these caring acts
can be considered as actions being done with care. This
being the case there is clearly an ethical and normative
dimension to care. We might connect this to the socio-
logical fact that a profession instantiates an ethics or,
better, an ethic [5,6]. A professional is someone who has
made a moral commitment to their clients, someone
who places the interests of their clients above their own.
When considered alongside the concept of a professional
ethics, Tronto’s notion of care makes explicit the double
normativity of the caring professions. As a recent (2014)
World Nursing Day slogan put it: “Nursing is my skill;
Caring is my profession”. There is a normative dimen-
sion to the intersubjective practice of care-giving as well
as in the more ‘skills focused’ formal ethics of the caring
professions, and these dimensions may not be aligned in
all cases. Health care professionals do not simply ‘pro-
fess’ their training or expertise; they profess to care. This
should not be read in the sense that they say they care
but in the sense that they pursue their profession as a
means of caring. The slogan speaks to the moral motiv-
ation, both initial and ongoing, of those who join the car-
ing professions. As Tronto puts it “caring is not so much
about the activities of care, but about the emotional in-
vestment that has been made in order to care” [3]f.
Given such a perspective we might consider the ques-
tion of how these ideals – those of individual profes-
sionals, of professions as social institutions, and of the
philosophical characterization of care - connect with the
realities of practice and the practical delivery of care.
First, we might note that they often do not. Recent fail-
ures in NHS care been extensively documented but are
not necessarily a new phenomenon [7]. In the 1960’s
Menzies Lyth’s seminal article ‘Social systems as a defense
against anxiety: An empirical study of the nursing service
of a general hospital’ articulated the difficulties inherent in
care as an everyday occupation, and the consequences for
its social organization [8]g. In her work Lyth details some
of the emotional challenges that arise within the practice
of nursing – intimate contact with strangers, the uncer-
tainty of recovery, the distress associated with chronic ill-
ness – and how a task-based, rather than patient centered
division of labor provide for a degree of organizational
defense or structural distance.
More recently Mol has analyzed what she calls the
‘logic of care’ [1]h. As an aspect of the logic of practice,
care always co-exists with other - sometimes competing
or incommensurable - logics [9]. Part of Mol’s purpose
is to contrast the ‘logic of care’ with the ‘logic of choice’
and to examine their uneasy relationship [1]. However,
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and errors”, things that are, unfortunately, ineliminable
parts of everyday life [1]i. Mol’s analysis suggests that
‘care’ cannot be used to define what is ‘good’ , ‘better’ or
‘worse’, at least, not outwith the logic of care, i.e. the ac-
tual practice(s) of health care [1]. ‘The good’ is defined
within such practices and what care is, is the situated
pursuit of ‘the good’ according to the contextually rele-
vant logic(s). Care is part of the situated pursuit of the
good, it is part of this species of activity. Attempts to de-
fine the good (or what constitutes care in a particular in-
stance) cannot “precede practice, but form a part of it”
[1]. Thus, “[t]he good is something to do, in practice, as
care goes on” [10] and the practices of care “entail a spe-
cific modality of handling questions to do with the
good” [10].
This view might be taken as being in conflict with the
fact that Tronto does define care. However, her suggestion
is that we consider care to be “a species of activity that in-
cludes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as pos-
sible” [3]. In this view good care or, we might say, quality
care is marked by “persistent tinkering in a world full of
complex ambivalence and shifting tensions” [10]. Her def-
inition of care suggests that what care is needs to be deter-
mined in practice and according to context. However, in
recent times the notion of ‘quality’ and not simply ‘good’
care has become politically significant and embedded in
the governance of modern health care. In contrast to the
idea of an object’s ‘property’ (or, to use the philosophical
term, its predicates) - but like care - the notion of an ob-
ject’s quality is (like the notion of ‘care’) inherently norma-
tive. Contemporary use of the word ‘quality’ in the context
of care assumes that we can sensibly talk about quality in
the abstract. This is misguided. If a discussion of quality is
to be useful it must refer to particular historically and
socio-culturally situated practices. A definition of quality,
independent of such context, is next to useless. Arguably,
then, a concern for the ‘Quality of Care’ can be taken to
be a concern for a level of excellence in health and social
care. Concern for the standard(s) of practice has been
translated into concern for not just the assessment, audit
and evaluation of those standards, but a particular form or
approach to ‘quality assurance’. In practice any attempt
to conduct ‘quality assurance’ assessments will be em-
bedded in specific managerial and bureaucratic proces-
sesj. Such processes are the primary mode through
which health care is evaluated and governed, rendering
them subject to public and political scrutiny. As a con-
sequence these processes have reflexive implications for
the social organization of practice, a point we discuss
further below. They also require some kind of ‘oper-
ational’ definition: whilst the notion of care resists def-
inition, Quality of Care cannot.What we might take Quality of Care to mean is open
to contestation and debate. It resists simple a priori def-
inition and is always in need of contextual operationali-
zation. Insofar as particular contexts are comparable, or
have common (social or structural) features, such as
those contexts within which various health care practices
are to be found, Quality of Care has been afforded a cer-
tain degree of characterization. Goldenberg considers at-
tempts to provide such characterization a ‘catalogue
approach’ , the main virtue of which is that it “helpfully
provides at least some guidance for policy and allocation
purposes” [11]. However, she argues that the various
traits and characteristics that are catalogued for the pur-
poses of defining Quality of Care are not accompanied
by a detailed justification. Instead they are understood to
be aligned with the prevailing “norms and values cur-
rently guiding (ideal) health care practice” [11].
Goldenberg’s broader argument is that this ‘catalogue’
approach means that Quality of Care is ‘persuasively’ ,
and therefore politically, defined. Such definitions are
predicated on the surrounding discourses through which
they derive constitutive meaning, the discourses of pub-
lic management, bureaucracy, and governance being par-
ticularly influential. In providing a ‘headline’ definition
of Quality of Care these discourses must also provide for
a level of flexibility in order that the existing variety of
services can be evaluated. As such, any definition of
Quality of Care is useful not because of the detail it pro-
vides but because that detail reflects the emotive, evalu-
ative or rhetorical content of the term. If a definition is
to be useful it will leave the rhetorical or political as-
pects of the term intact [11]. However, whilst any at-
tempt to define ‘Quality of Care’ will contain ambiguous
elements and whilst it will always remain possible to ob-
ject to particular, ‘catalogued’ , details, it is nevertheless
the case that general claims about the importance of
‘quality care’ will remain difficult to resist. Consequently
the management and governance of health care will con-
tinue to need and rely on ‘Quality of Care’ discourses.
The idea of Quality of Care has a political function, one
that can be used to engender the formation of social
movement(s) and promote change. However the idea
also aligns with the socio-political context of contempor-
ary governance, the management of public services and
with the specific ‘organizational format’ of its associated
bureaucracyk.
In the context of health care, ideas about Quality of
Care can be placed in the service of a variety of ends,
not all of them compatible with each other. For example,
we might think Quality of Care governance acts to im-
prove care itself or acts as a device that mitigates polit-
ical accountability by institutionalizing a bureaucratized
form of managerial accountability. In so doing ministers
are afforded a degree of protection since although they
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able [12]. If we think political accountability is important
then, as Nelson remarks, “obscurities concerning the no-
tion of ‘quality of care’ are not matters about which we
can afford to be insouciant” [13]. We might then con-
clude that the obscurities we should be concerned with
are not simply internal but also relate to the broader
political role of the notion and its institutionalization. A
definition offered by Goldenberg is useful precisely be-
cause it highlights the potential for internal and external
conflicts, the variation in situated understanding, and
the perspectival contestations inherent in the meaning
of Quality of Care. She says that:
Quality of care refers to the attributes of a health care
service that are taken by the relevant stakeholders to
be important enough to be measured and promoted
within an organization [11].
With deliberate irony, Goldenberg goes on to suggest
that this is “the kind of definition that should not be
entertained in the health quality assurance literature” be-
cause: it offers “no logical room for dissent”; it avoids
“all potential points of disagreement by taking no pos-
ition on whether the term refers to process or outcome,
property or evaluation”; it does not imply any “poten-
tially controversial position on the content or context of
quality care”; and the vacuity of this “descriptive mean-
ing [means that a wide variety of meanings or interpreta-
tions] can be carefully attached to the term by savvy
policy makers” [11]. Whilst we agree with Goldenberg
that the flexibility of this definition is deeply problematic
in practical or political terms it is nevertheless particu-
larly useful for the purposes of critical analysis of Quality
of Care discourses and the practices that are meant to
ensure it. The analytic utility of this definition lies in its
potential to highlight the fact that the ability to what is
important enough to be measured and promoted within
particular contexts is politically determined; it is a func-
tion of power. In more Bourdieuan terms it is a function
of ones position in the field – and therefore the disposi-
tions and capitals that correlate with this position – all
of which provides those in such positions with the ability
to impose their perspective via encoding it in the evalu-
ative procedures of ‘quality assurance’. A corollary of
this is that Goldenberg’s definition also highlights who or
what is subordinated to these measures and therefore, the
perspectives that are neglected. From a socio-analytic per-
spective the flexibility and contextual utility suggested by
Goldenberg’s definition is not a flaw: it reflects the reality
of Quality of Care discourse.
Rather than taking this to undermine Quality of Care
and the bureaucratic processes that seek to assure it, we
might accept it as an unavoidable consequence of themodern management and governance of health care.
Thus rather than question ‘Quality of Care’ per se we
might offer more specific critiques that focus on its use,
and the effects of its use, within particular contexts.
Goldenberg’s discussion makes clear that we should not
conflate the delivery of care with processes or proce-
dures to ensure its quality and that both can be distin-
guished from the theorization of care offered by feminist
ethics, something that should not be mistaken for a sin-
gular or fully unified project [14]. Furthermore, whilst
the social organization of health care can, and some-
times does, militate against the caring dispositions of
professionals [8], it would be facile to suggest that any
and all bureaucratic procedures or managerial processes
should be abandoned because of this; a lack of proper
managerial oversight will also lead to failures in care.
Even when a professionally endorsed procedure becomes
the target of criticism, such as in the case of recent con-
troversy about the Liverpool Care Pathway (LPC), there
is no argument that a commonality of approach is, in it-
self, undesirable [15].
What is required is a more sophisticated understand-
ing of the relationship between the front-line practices
of care and the way(s) in which they are managed. We
must consider the material and social impact of particu-
lar rules, guidelines or management structures that act
to condition and recondition professional practices. This
consideration should go beyond explicitly stated aims
and objectives to encompass the broader consequences
or practical effects of the policy. Like any form of sur-
veillance the collection of data in the context of ‘New
Public Management’ (cf. [16]) is subject to Merton’s ‘law
of unintended consequences’ [17]. It is particularly im-
portant to consider the collection of ‘Quality of Care’
data and the relationship between this activity and the
actual delivery of care. The assumption underpinning
such data collection is that it can proceed in such a way
as to leave the practice it intends to evaluate untouched.
However, consider reported attempts to ‘massage’ or
otherwise manipulate records concerning treatment
times at NHS Accident and Emergency Departments
[18,19]. Recording the time it takes for patients to re-
ceive attention does not leave practice untouched when
front-line staff have been made aware, that: 1) particular
waiting times are acceptable and others are not; and 2)
waiting times will be determined in a particular way.
From an ‘audit culture’ perspective the collection of data
about a particular practice has tangible and immediate
effects [20]; it is fallacious and potentially harmful to
dichotomize frontline practice and the managerial struc-
tures that command, control and facilitate it. Rather, we
should reflect critically on the nature of the picture be-
ing constructed by such data and, in so doing, attempt
to develop an account of the relationship between
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care and Quality of Care, that will facilitate a more fruit-
ful - mutually engaging and enlightening – dialogue, one
that engages in the holistic promotion of the caring
endeavor.
To conclude this section, whilst the moral or norma-
tive sense of care resists easy definition, and this resist-
ance has consequences for our assessment of health
care, the need to define ‘Quality of Care’ is unavoidable;
it is required if we are to properly govern and organize
our health care services. Given this state of affairs we
should remain alive to the potential for misalignment
and conflict between, on the one hand, professional
practices and delivery of care and, on the other, the
management of those activities at both the meso and
macro levels.
The unintended consequences of bureaucracy
In his classic article, ‘The Tyranny of Light’ , Tsoukas [21]
argues that the pursuit of information can undermine,
rather than enhance, our knowledge of a particular prac-
tice. The supposed objectivity of administrative and bur-
eaucratic records, the instruments of governance, has
brought about the dissolution of perspective and allowed
an increase in ‘data’ to be mistaken for an increase in
insight and understanding. Tsoukas identifies two prob-
lematic assumptions: first, that information increases the
transparency with which we understand some object;
second, that such information can be used to control or
(re)engineer that object. Against these assumptions he
argues that the logic of governance dictates: “that which
is measurable, standardizable, auditable is measured…
[such measurements come]… to stand for, to represent,
the phenomenon at hand” [21]. The implication is that
what is not measurable, standardizable, auditable is not
measured and so cannot be taken as standing for, as
representing, the phenomenon at hand. This is not sim-
ply a facet of the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects of
the target domain; it is certainly possible (although may
not necessarily be desirable) to subject the latter to
forms of standardized assessment (cf. [22,23]). Rather it
is about the nature of bureaucratic representations and
the degree to which they can be considered as ‘standing
for’ the object, or phenomenon represented. Tsoukas of-
fers a particularly apposite example:
[T]he quality of teaching (an inherently ambiguous
notion) tends to be formally ascertained by the quality
of the procedures that are thought to lead to good
teaching. Procedural ideals of performance represent
(and thus reconstruct) our understanding of quality.
Notice, however that, as mentioned earlier, ‘quality in
teaching’ is nowhere to be seen in the information
gathered - it rather needs to be inferred from it [21].Accounts of ‘Quality of Care’ and the administrative
procedures - which is to say bureaucracies - constituted
to assess it are similarly and inherently ambiguous.
Quality of Care is formally ascertained by the quality of
the procedures that are thought to lead to or reflect the
delivery of good care as it is inferred from the informa-
tion gathered by and about these proceduresl. The infor-
mation is generated by managerial, administrative and
bureaucratic procedures. These procedures shed light on
(but do not simply reflect) specific aspects of practice:
those that can be codified and therefore recorded. Other
aspects are not only left in the shadows but are actively
pushed into the shadows as a result of the light being
castm. This can be most clearly seen if we consider the
reflexive consequences of audit as a mode of manage-
ment, evaluation and assurance or control [20]. Once
something – or somethings – become an indicator of
performance then those whose performance is being
assessed often come to focus on the indicator(s) altering
the way in which they accomplish the practice as a
whole. For example, it has been suggested that education
has become overly focused on ‘teaching to the test’. In
health care we have attempts to manipulate, or other-
wise circumnavigate, the collection of information used
to assess the Quality of Caren. More subtly, procedures
put in place to support the collection of data relevant to
the Quality and Outcomes Framework in general prac-
tice, such as structured electronic templates for chronic
disease management, have been shown to profoundly in-
fluence and shape the conduct and meaning of chronic
disease reviews [24]. The fact the practices of govern-
ance have reflexive consequences for the practices being
governed demonstrates the second of Tsoukas’ points. If
social practices are affected by attempts to audit them
then the picture generated is not only a poor representa-
tion of practice (at the very least the data is often out of
date) but the assumed primary virtue of this informa-
tion, its decontextualized nature, is undermined. If the
reflexivity of the social world means that it reacts to our
attempts to represent it then our ability to govern on the
basis of ‘objective’ information is questionable. Bureau-
cratic records, the levers of governance, do not produce,
or ‘archive’ , collections of disinterested facts, or archives
of neutral measurements. On the contrary, they are the
inscriptions of a studied, and practiced, disinterest.
This suggestion opens the door to a number of well-
rehearsed critiques of bureaucratic managerialism. In
the hands of some this has led to calls to bring the rule
of ‘the bureaux’o to an end and predictions of a ‘post-
bureaucratic’ era [25]. However, like du Gay [25], we do
not consider ‘bureaucracy’ to be a singular phenomena
but a “diversely formatted organizational device” (2005:1,
3). It, and paperwork more generally [26], can be consid-
ered an ineliminable technique in the conduct and
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social life of institutions. It is a technology and one that
structures the social world(s) we inhabit. The idea of a
bureaucracy cannot be considered good or bad in itself,
and therefore we should, in each case, consider the inher-
ently normative character of its socially structuring func-
tion and the potential moral implications - both intended
and unintended - of that structure. As such the idea of a
‘bureaucracy’ cannot be subject to any simply moral evalu-
ation, tempting as it is. Instead we might consider particu-
lar instantiations to be morally problematic, particularly
those that can be described as overly bureaucratic. A bur-
eaucratic bureaucracy embodies “an instrumental ration-
ality through which technical questions become split from
ethical and aesthetic ones” [27].
As Kafka suggests “[w]e tend to condemn bureaucracy
and bureaucrats when better explanations elude us” [26].
At the very least we ought to look for better or, perhaps,
fuller explanations before denunciating such an easy tar-
get. We should consider the way Quality of Care bureau-
cracies are constituted and, subsequently, practiced or
‘put into practice’ . Which is to say that we should con-
sider the way Quality of Care procedures are imple-
mented, how the data produced is evaluated, and how
these evaluations are subsequently utilized. Furthermore,
we should be prepared to do so in an ongoing manner.
One might start with the idea that health care practices
and the care they deliver are subject to a set of manager-
ial process that are overly reliant on a form of bureau-
cratic rationality. Such rationality deploys a set of
techniques for the ‘disinterested’ (see below for further
discussion of this term) objectification of practice. Inso-
far as the social organization of health care is a pre-
requisite for the delivery and promotion of good care
and the identification of substandard care such objectifi-
cation has a good deal to offer. However, bureaucratic-
ally rational frameworks can also structure practice in
such a way that the provision of excellent care is dis-
couraged. The objectification of practice is reductive as
the focus is not on ‘care’ - the intersubjective interplay
between those who care and those who are cared for –
per se but on measure of Care Quality. Certainly the re-
duction is, to a degree, a necessary and unavoidable con-
sequence of bureaucratic objectification. Nevertheless
the objectification of care has, at minimum, the potential
to structurally disincentivize the delivery of health care
with care. Using the Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic vio-
lence the next section explores this possibly further.
Bureaucracy and the potential for symbolic violence
Given it is a socio-historically variable phenomena or, as
du Gay has it “a many-sided, evolving, diversified
organizational device” [25], no singular conception of
bureaucracy can be entirely adequate. If we are to extendour analysis of the disjunction between care and Quality
of Care, some greater specification is needed. Further-
more given that this organizational device is variable,
ineliminable and cannot be subject to a blanket moral
disapproval then we can only seek to subject it to socio-
analysis and critiquep. Using the critical potential offered
by Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence this section
offers a characterization of the particular bureaucracy in-
volved in the organization, management and governance
of UK health care [28].
As Clarke [29] points out the political landscape of the
UK is such that the associated bureaucracies of its gov-
ernment have been fundamentally (re)configured by the
ideology of ‘New Public Management.’ A consequence
has been the development of evaluative processes and
bodies, including the Care Quality Commission, which
attempts to ensure or assure (through a process of
evaluation) high quality care. These evaluative institu-
tions are a significant development in modern govern-
ment’s audit culture and central to the UK’s current
‘arms-length’ approach to the delivery and management
of public services [29]. This approach to accountability
in the public service sector suggests that bodies - such
as the CQC - are something more than evaluators of the
Quality of Care; they are regulators. Given this role we
should acknowledge that the process of evaluation - and
not simply its results - are effective in shaping practice.
As institutions are required to actively produce the data
required by regulators, managers and practitioners be-
come aware of the data’s symbolic meaning. Further-
more, the CQC is granted the authority to audit and
evaluate the delivery of care and, in so doing, to
‘operationalize’ and apply the (politically) working defin-
ition of ‘Quality of Care’.
The exercise of authority involves the exercise of what
Bourdieu calls symbolic power and, therefore, an inher-
ent asymmetry. However, we should not assume that the
existence of such asymmetry is necessarily problematic;
the existence of symbolic power and its variable distribu-
tion is a fact of social life. Indeed, in this context, it is
important to recognize that “the structural and symbolic
power wielded by doctors is legitimate, socially conferred
and indispensible for help and healing to occur” [30]
and we might think similarly for the management and
governance of health care. Furthermore, once we have
recognized the operations of symbolic power then we
might concern ourselves with the way it is being exer-
cised and reflect on whether or not its use can be char-
acterized as involving ‘violence’ or domination. Given its
connection to language and knowledge [31] we cannot
escape it and we should, pace Foucault’s conception of
power more generally, see it as a productive phenomena.
Nevertheless, as a form of power, there is the potential
for repression as well as production and we should
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‘symbolic violence’q.
The notion of symbolic violence might seem unduly
provocative. However we are not suggesting that Quality
of Care bureaucracies are, in fact, symbolically violent.
Rather we are suggesting that, whether physical or sym-
bolic, the exercise of power always has the potential for
violence – it is always possible for our activities to in-
volve the domination of others. Our view diverges from
the Bourdieuan orthodoxy, which would appear to sug-
gest that symbolic violence, and not just symbolic power,
can be both legitimate and illegitimate. For example,
Bourdieu appears to consider pedagogy as always involv-
ing symbolic violence [32]. However given that pedagogy
is unavoidable, particularly insofar as tacit pedagogy is
implicated in human social development (socialization),
then it would seem violence is unavoidable. Such a pos-
ition means that we must discern ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms
of violence. Instead we think that we should distinguish
between good and bad forms of symbolic power and
consider the latter to be symbolic violence. Thus we pre-
fer to consider education as involving the exercise of
symbolic power. As such it is not necessarily violent but
may dominate rather than emancipate. Similarly Quality
of Care bureaucracies necessarily involve the exercise of
symbolic power. The challenge is to ensure we consider
the way this power can be legitimately exercised, in the
interest of whatever ‘good’ is at hand (in this case the
good of care), and to remain alive to the possibility that
it might become ‘violent’ , illegitimate, and act against
the good at hand (which, in this case, would involve the
structural domination of health care professionals and
the practice of care).
Expanding on Goldenberg’s view of the importance of
‘relevant stakeholders’ [11] we can see Quality of Care
discourses are not only constructed by distinguishing be-
tween who is, and is not, considered a relevant stake-
holder and, subsequently, by differentiating between
those who are least relevant and those who are most
relevant. The consequences of such distinctions will fun-
damentally alter the Quality of Care discourse and those
with the symbolic capital to make, and enforce, such dis-
tinctions will dominate the Quality of Care discourse. In
this way a particular point of view will be encoded
within the symbolic processes and used to evaluate the
actual practices of health and social care. Furthermore,
in order to enquire into the Quality of Care in specific
instances it is inevitable that a bureaucracy procedure
will be used and will, therefore, impose a pre-existing
and pre-constructed perspective on the practices being
evaluated. Through the collection of ‘objective’ (or ‘ob-
jectified’) data in accordance with a particular symbolic
structure an administrative, or symbolic, representation
of the practice will be produced.Thus, what we know about the Quality of Care, both
‘in theory’ and ‘in practice’ can be seen as part of a strug-
gle over ‘methodology’ . A Quality of Care methodology
is not simply neutral and objective but productive and
world-making;r it brings something new into existence,
namely a declaration regarding the quality of the care
being delivered. Given that this evaluation (both its re-
sults and its implementation) is designed to have a regu-
latory function then it should be considered a significant
locus of symbolic power. Audits are contemporary tech-
nologies of evaluation and should be considered part
and parcel of the field(s) they render accountable. This is
precisely because as forms of bureaucracy, as organizational
devices, institutionalized audits act in such as way as to en-
gender ‘audit-ability’. Whether or not it is considered ‘suc-
cessful’ the attempt to exert control runs counter to the
narrative of an audit or evaluation as objective, as leav-
ing that which is audited or evaluated untouched. The
institutionalization of an audit culture entails a (re)con-
figuration of the field such that it can be audited and is
therefore “easier to regulate in the name of quality”
[33,34]. The difficulty posed is similar to that raised by
Law in his analysis of social science research methods:
“The argument is no longer that methods discover and
depict realities. Instead, it is that they participate in
the enactment of those realities. It is also that method
is not just a more or less complicated set of
procedures or rules, but rather a bundled hinterland”
[35]s.
The CQC is part of a ‘bundled hinterland’ and its dis-
tance is, in part, created by the methodologies of audit,
something that requires what Herzfeld calls ‘bureau-
cratic indifference’ [34,36] and Bourdieu would call (bur-
eaucratic) disinterest [37]t. However, in creating a space
within which symbolic power can be exercised bureau-
cracy becomes distanced from practice. This creates the
potential for bureaucracies to not only “slip from the
model of reality to the reality of model” [38] but for
structurally embedded procedural imperatives to become
privileged over the ends of practice [39]. It is at this
point that the potential for symbolic power to become
problematic emerges. The distance that the practice of
disinterest creates generates the conditions within which
bureaucratic exercises can become symbolically violent
and therefore come to place structural constraints on
the caring practices they are supposed to promote.
This view accords with Strathern’s suggestion that
“current practices of audit and surveillance are far from
‘indifferent’; on the contrary they present the face of ob-
sessive concern (care/interference)” [34]. The terminology
of ‘obsessive concern’ and ‘interference’ is suggestive of in-
trusion, violence and domination and, furthermore, the
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methodology, its ‘objectivity’, something that is not pro-
duced through indifference simpliciter but through a stud-
ied and practiced indifference, or Bourdieu’s notion of
disinterest. The posture of disinterest expresses a particu-
lar kind of interest, one that values objectivity, which is to
say a form of symbolic neutrality and is, therefore, a func-
tion of an underlying symbolic capital and power. It is
through the adoption of a disinterested stance that audits
(auditors and those who promote the audit as a style of
evaluation, management and quality control/ assurance)
purport to care. This is assumed to be necessary because
such disinterest produces an ‘objective’ or, more accur-
ately, ‘objectified’ picture of health care. This is held to be
the first step in a process of ‘continuous improvement’ or
‘total quality management’. Bodies like the CQC are
invested with the political authority to name, categorize,
pronounce judgment and determine social reality - the
‘facts’ of the matter - precisely because they appear to ex-
press a disinterested form of interest, they appear to be
objective [32]u. However, symbolic domination is not
merely a function of these pronouncements but of the
way those judged anticipate and respond to these pro-
nouncements and the way in which they are produced.
Bourdieu and Boltanski suggest that:
“Symbolic domination really begins when the
misrecognition (meconnaissance) implied by
recognition (reconnaissance) leads those who are
dominated to apply the dominant criteria of
evaluation to their own practices” .
([40], cited in [41] authors translation).
In the case of Quality of Care audits or evaluations
one should not simply blame those who are dominated
for their own domination. However, they are ‘complicit’
in the way that the supposed measures of Quality have
become reiterated – recognized and misrecognized - as
targetsv. This slippage is, in part, a function of the law of
unintended consequences, but one that has come to be
embedded in the logic of New Public Management; what
was once a systemic problem, and an organization vice,
has been turned into a managerial strategy, and an
organizational virtuew. Quality of Care evaluations have
come to have priority in the actual delivery of care and
therefore methodological indicators - measures – of care
quality come to be seen as targets – substantive facts
about care quality. The actual practice(s) of health care
have become subordinated to ‘Quality of Care’ and, ra-
ther than being responsive to patients, professionals are
increasingly required to respond to the imperatives of
the evaluative bureaucracy invested with the symbolic
power to pass judgment. The violent exercise of symbolic
power is essential to the development and maintenance ofthis dynamic; it is a consequence of allowing a form of
bureaucracy to become a management style, the function
of which is predicated on having the symbolic capital re-
quired to monopolize, which is to say dominate, the
process. This all but guarantees that the exercise of sym-
bolic power will entail symbolic violence and that frontline
practices are subject to the symbolic domination by the
organizational mode meant to facilitate it.
Summary: caring about quality of care
At the outset of this paper we distinguished between the
moral concept ‘care’ and the professional practice of
health care. We suggested that the latter can be done
with more or less of the former and that excellent health
care is associated with more, and not less, moral care.
Concern for the Quality of Care is concern that health
care is done with care; it is a moral concern. However,
any attempt to evaluate the Quality of Care in particular
cases or institutions can only gesture towards an evaluation
of ‘care’ as a moral ideal. The practicalities of bureaucracy,
audit, evaluation and ‘quality assurance’ methodology
mean that whilst we can construct symbolic representa-
tions of the Quality of Care predicated on the practical de-
livery of health care, care itself remains a frontline task that
can only be guaranteed by those who actually deliver it,
their ethics and professionalism. The Quality of Care dis-
course finds its main usefulness in the management and
organization of health and social care. As such it can con-
tribute towards the provision of care but cannot guarantee
care as a moral phenomenon. Furthermore, the law of un-
intended consequences means that institutionalized audit-
ing processes of such bureaucracies may actively militate
against care as a moral practice. Paradoxically the institu-
tionalized goals or targets created by bureaucratic pro-
cesses of ‘assurance’ have a not insignificant potential to
displace the goals they are seeking to assure. As a symbolic
practice Quality of Care evaluations have the potential ei-
ther to dominate or emancipate the actual practice of care.
Arguably Quality of Care evaluations appear to be subject-
ing contemporary health care practices and practitioners to
a greater level of domination than emancipation. This is, at
least in part, a function of measures becoming targets,
something that has unintended consequences, not least of
which is the production of perverse incentives. The sym-
bolic and structural domination of health care profes-
sionals is such that they may become overly responsive to
concerns and targets rooted in Quality of Care discourses
and frameworks at the expense of being responsive to the
needs of patients for care.
If this is the case then it is imperative that we collect-
ively consider how ‘our’ political expectations promote
symbolically violent forms of bureaucracy and audit.
Furthermore we should engage with the unintended con-
sequences of bureaucracy and the potential for symbolic
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scope of this essay we can offer some suggestions predi-
cated on the notion of care as a moral, or ethico-political,
concept. In the first instance we suggest that it is neces-
sary to rethink our understanding of Quality of Care as an
auditable phenomena. If we regard care as involving
emotional investment, or an activity that involves the
repair of our ‘world’ such that we can live well [3] then
it is not something that can be subject to a comprehen-
sive audit. It cannot be considered fully accountable to
any organizational device or bureaucracy, and any at-
tempt to render it fully accountable will founder. If we
want care of a certain quality there is a point at which
we have to trust the professionals who would care for
us. This does not mean simply letting professionals (or
professions) ‘off the hook’ but explicitly revisiting the
notion of the profession as vocation, with which comes
a set of rights, privileges, duties and obligations. This
might point to a need for bureaucratic reorganization
and reorientation. If we were to reimagine Quality of
Care evaluations then we might think if them as caring
for rather than simply caring about the delivery of good
care, and this would necessarily include a need to care
for the professionals charged with delivering care. Such
a re-orientation would bring the actions, judgments,
orientations and dispositions of practitioners in particu-
lar caring contexts to the foreground. This would mean
abandoning the objectivity of ‘studied disinterest’, some-
thing that allows the CQC to care about practice from
a distance. It would mean recognizing the complexity,
ambivalence and shifting tensions [10] of social reality
and the inadequacies, or limitations, of any methodo-
logical evaluation, particularly prescriptive methodological
evaluation of the sort required for the enactment of a real-
ity that allows measurements to be transmuted into tar-
gets. We need to ‘unbundle’ the hinterland of the CQC
and open it up to the kind of persistent tinkering that, for
Mol and her co-authors [10], signifies the specific mo-
dality of care, and the care-ful pursuit of the good. Such
tinkering presents a challenge to the procedural object-
ification of practice inherent in audit and bureaucratic
rationality, demanding that they exhibit an ‘attuned at-
tentiveness’ and adopt an ‘adaptive’ posture [10]. Such a
stance would not only militate against mistaking Qual-
ity of Care models for the reality of care itself, but act
against the potential for procedural imperatives to be-
come privileged over the ends of health care. Rather
than ‘adapting’ practice to bureaucratic structures, as in
the case of patients waiting in ambulances outside of
casualty, we should become attuned to the limitations
of procedurally generated data and attend to the way in
which this data is used. In this way the assurance of
care quality becomes a form of ongoing experimenta-
tion and, ideally, one that encompasses the ability toreflexively respond to changes in practice, some of
which will be produced through Quality of Care activ-
ities themselves.
The idea of ‘persistent tinkering’ connects with Tronto’s
suggestion for ‘creating caring institutions’ [42]. It also fur-
thers her perspective that the moral concept of ‘care’
presents a challenge to the traditional boundary be-
tween morality and politics [3]. It suggests that the
CQC should itself become a caring institution, one that
cares for Quality of Care and those who deliver it. As
such it should not simply implement political defined
programs of audit but address the implications and
consequences of such evaluations. One way of doing
this would be to more actively involve health care pro-
fessionals in their own evaluations and in the constitu-
tion of the evaluative process as a whole. It might also
suggest that we abandon, or at least relax, the meth-
odological rigidity of Quality of Care frameworks, the
basis of impartial audits. Whilst this rigidity facilitates
institutional comparisons, something that is not neces-
sarily objectionable, it does so to such a degree that we
have become encouraged to produce league tables. This
approach does little to care for our system of health
care either as a whole or in respect of its particular in-
stitutions. Loosening this rigidity would facilitate the
kind of ‘persistent tinkering’ that, “in a world full of
complex ambivalence and shifting tensions” [10], Mol,
Moser and Pols consider to be indicative of good care.
Whilst this suggests we should abandon an inflexible
approach to Quality of Care audits we are not suggesting
that we abandon a methodological approach to such eval-
uations or that we engage in a form of methodological an-
archy or, at least, not outright. We should, however, open
our evaluative methodologies to a form of ‘persistent tin-
kering’ consistent with Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity
[43]. Given that what is under discussion is not social sci-
entific research but, broadly speaking, the use of social sci-
ence methods in the process of social life then we might
consider the institutionalization of ‘reflexivity’ as a part of
this process rather than, merely, a function of the re-
searcher or, in this case, the auditor.
Endnotes
aIn this paper we capitalize the term ‘Quality of Care’
to indicate that we are talking about the discourse and
specific sub-disocurses as well as the formal evaluation
of care to which such discourses have given rise.
bAs will become clear in our discussion of Quality of
Care and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) the div-
ision between the latter two levels – managerial (meso)
and political (macro) - is increasingly blurred. This is be-
cause ‘arms-length’ bodies are designed to inoculate the
political sphere from its responsibilities and its account-
ability, and so the supposedly autonomous managerial
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same bodies [29]. This fact is borne out by the ‘political’
nature of Quality of Care discourses (see below discus-
sion below).
cSee Mol [1] on the notion of ‘cure’ as ‘care.’
dThe metaphor of accounting, and the way it shapes of
‘accountability’ [33] is a vital part of our contemporary
audit culture and the rhetoric that maintains it [34]. Indeed
Strathern sees it as fundamental, suggesting that “account-
ancy [has] become linked to a more general idea of ac-
countability, and with it an expansion of the domain of
auditing” [44]. Furthermore the preference for account-
ability over responsibility was, Kafka [26] suggests, central
to the creation of ‘paperwork’ and bureaucracy as the
organizational form of the modern nation state.
eThere are, of course, plenty of other definitions and
discussions of care to be found in the literature on fem-
inist ethics. Held, for example, considers it to be “both a
practice, or cluster of practices, and a value, or cluster of
values” and distinguishes this from the characteristics
(dispositions) of caring persons [45]. Furthermore, such
conceptual diversity should be seen as a strength of fem-
inist ethics, a mode of thought that perceives the value
in being a collective and dialectical endeavor [46]. This
whilst this essay adopts Tronto’s perspective on ‘care’ we
do not seek to be dogmatic in our attachment to it. We
thank Professor Johnathan Herring for his comments re-
garding alternative models of care.
fOf course, in practice, the existence of such motiv-
ation will vary and may be more or less inchoate. It
might also be subject to erosion.
gMuch of Menzies Lyth’s other work is also highly rele-
vant. In particular see Volume 1 of her Selected Essays,
‘Containing Anxiety in Institutions’ [47]. Also see Jocelyn
Cornwall’s conference presentation ‘Words, deeds and
structures: patients’ experience and human factors in health
care delivery and policy’ (http://www.cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/
Programme/Recent%20events/Quality%20in%20Healthcare).
The paper was delivered to the 2013 Cumberland Lodge
Colloquium ‘The Many Meanings of Care’ co-organized
by the authors of this paper, further information and re-
sources are available from the legacy site: http://www.
cumberlandlodge.ac.uk/Resources/CumberlandLodge2011/
Documents/Programme/Reports/Quality%20in%20Healthcare
%20report.pdf.
hIn her discussion of what she means by ‘logic’ Mol draws
on the notion of a discourse within which “words, material-
ities and practices hang together in a specific, historically
and culturally situated way” [1]. Her analytic use of the
term is an attempt to get at the “rationality, or rather
the rationale, of the practices” [1] at hand, namely
health care. Below we turn this idea - of the embedded
logic of a practice - on the practices bureaucracy, man-
agement and governance.iTo say that error and even neglect are an ineliminable
part of everyday life and, therefore, of health care does
not to invite us to adopt a fatalist approach to their ex-
istence or, worse, particular instances of their existence.
Rather it is to acknowledge the ideal notion of care op-
erative in this context and the problem with thinking it
is always and everywhere achievable. Such a view would
not only be an act of individual and collective hubris but
to misunderstand the nature of the concept being put
forward and the complexity of (human) being. Thinking
that neglect and error are fully eliminable is akin to
thinking that no hospital can (or should) perform at a
‘below average’ level.
jAs discussed further below the particular formation is
that of ‘New Public Management’ [16].
kOur use of the term appeals to its original sense, as
something intimately associated with the administration
of government and what, in the UK, is called the Civil
Service, see du Gay [48] and Kafka [26].
lAs a reviewer of this article points out it is interesting
that the CQC is focused on procedures rather than out-
comes. In part this is because healthcare has managed to
resist the imposition of ‘league-tables’ , something that
can be contrasts with similar quality assurance projects
in other domains such as education. This is likely due to
the greater institutional and political power of health
care and, specifically, the medical professional to resist
the external imposition of evaluative assessments as
compared to that found within education and wielded
by teachers and academics. Thus, a focus on outcomes
cannot be positioned as an alternative mode of measure-
ment or evaluation as they remain determined by bur-
eaucratic and procedural means. Furthermore, it is
unclear if, or for how long, this state of affairs will con-
tinue. Given current developments it is likely that, in
one shape or another, health care will be subject to out-
come evaluations. We thank Professor Søren Holm for
pushing us to make this point clear.
mIt is worth drawing the readers’ attention to Strathern’s
essay ‘The Tyranny of Transparency’ [49]. Here she builds
on Tsoukas and considers audit as a process of ‘making
thing visible’ and what such visibility might conceal.
nConsider the 2008 report on the fact that some pa-
tients were being kept in ambulances as Accident and
Emergency waiting times, something subject to evalu-
ation, only began once patients exited ambulances and
entered hospitals [18,19].
oAs Kafka points out that the creation of Bureaucracy as a
form of government has its roots in the French Revolution
and was, literally, the invention of a new form of rule not
“by the many [democracy], the few [aristocracy], and the
one [monarchy] but … by a piece of office furniture” [26].
pThe term socio-analysis can be considered a “collect-
ive counterpart to psycho-analysis … [that] can help us
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tions”, [50] cultures and societies. It is often used by
Bourdieu and indicates the potential his conception of
sociologically reflexive critique has for resistance and eman-
cipation. Socio-analysis introduces an ethico-political di-
mension to the social sciences, to sociology and to
sociological critique [51].
qIn what follows we diverge from the Bourdieuan
orthodoxy, which suggests symbolic violence, and not
just symbolic power, can be both legitimate and illegit-
imate. Bourdieu develops his notion of symbolic power
through an analogy with physical violence [50]. In par-
ticular he focuses on the way the state seeks to
monopolize the exercise of physical violence. We demur
from his analysis and suggest that the state seeks to
monopolize the use of legitimate physical force. How-
ever, at least in part, it does so through legally, which is
to say symbolically, defining what is and is not legitimate
physical force. Thus the point at which legitimate force
becomes illegitimate violence is determined by the sym-
bolic power invested in the state. What counts as legit-
imate and illegitimate is determined by reference to the
symbolic structures of society and, therefore, through
the exercise of symbolic power and, implicitly or poten-
tially, violence. Thus, as Bourdieu suggests, the problem
of symbolic violence is at its most insidious when it is
misrecognized as legitimate.
rThe ‘world-making’ properties of symbolic capital and
power is an essential facet of its potential for both vio-
lence and emancipation [52,53].
sBourdieu also connect the problems of bureaucracy
to those of the social science suggesting that “All the is-
sues raised about bureaucracy, such as those of neutral-
ity and disinterestedness, are posed also about sociology
itself – only at a higher degree of difficulty” [37].
tBourdieu contrasts the terms indifference and disinter-
est. The latter is actually a particular kind of interest. As
such it can be part of what Bourdieu calls a field’s illusio
and, therefore, a strategy for success. Consider, for ex-
ample the disinterest of the scientist and the way this is a
form of interest rather than indifference. In what follows
we refer to disinterest as a kind of ‘studied and practiced
indifference.’ However this contrasts with true indiffer-
ence which is to be understood as a lack of dis/interest.
Thus when Strathern, Herzfeld and Shore (see below) use
the term indifference they do so in accordance with Bour-
dieu’s disinterest. This point resolves the problem being
raised, as Bourdieu’s conception of disinterest is a form,
mode or style of interest invested with a particular sort of
symbolic capital. Such capital is central to the social and
symbolic power of bureaucracies, audits and, for that mat-
ter science, including social science ([37], cf. [54]).
uThe fact that the CQC had many of its pronounce-
ments undermined in late 2009 when they were seen toconflict with The Good Hospital Guide, a publication
produced by academics working on behalf of a private
Company (Dr Foster Intelligence), can be seen as con-
firmation of this point: social reality is not simply a mat-
ter of fact but of power and having the symbolic capital
to prevail. As Bourdieu says, “[s]ymbolic power is the
power of creating things with words” [53]. In this case
the word of ‘Dr Foster’ and the Good Hospital Guide
outweighed those of the CQC. See Taylor [55] for an ac-
count of this conflict. We would also note that the fact
this controversy resulted in a conflict between two dif-
ferent auditors acts to insulate the political sphere from
its responsibilities.
vSignificantly, the point originates in an analysis of
monetary policy where it is know as Goodhart’s Law
[56].
wOf course, whilst little reminder is needed, it is clear
that this development has not been entirely successful.
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